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THE USE OF ERRONEOUS EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
ANTITRUST CASES AND ITS ESTABLISHMENT AS





Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act' prohibits any combination be-
tween market participants which results in restraining interstate commerce.
Although either criminal prosecution 2 or a civil cause of action 3 may be ini-
tiated due to an express agreement to restrain trade, more often little or no
direct evidence exists to prove a conspiracy. Instead, the finder of fact must
usually draw inferences based substantially on circumstantial evidence, pri-
marily witness testimony and written commentary on current economic the-
ories of market structure and price behavior. Unfortunately, the nature of
economics as a social science whose fundamental theories are frequently dis-
puted only accentuates the indefinite character of this circumstantial evi-
dence. Finally, the difficulty and complexity of this dilemma increases when
courts fail to obtain and properly apply predominate economic theory in
their antitrust economic analysis.
This article will discuss this dilemma as it relates to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Pevely Dafry Co. v. United States.4 First we will
demonstrate that the court of appeals did not fully understand the economic
theories of the 1940's and, in fact, misapplied them in Pevelv by failing to
examine the effect of tight oligopoly or duopoly market structure on price
behavior. Second, through the use of empirical studies, we will discuss pric-
ing behavior of market competitors in a tight oligopoly or duopoly given a
standardized product, and given this scenario, the presumption of antitrust
violation which should operate where uniform pricing is present. Finally we
will point out subsequent cases which incorrectly followed or deftly side-
stepped the erroneous economic theories articulated in Pevely, and how
* Professor of Business Administration, University of Illinois; B.S. 1951, University of
Southwestern Louisiana, M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1967, University of Houston (economics).
** Associate Professor, University of Illinois; A.B. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976,
M.B.A. 1977, University of Georgia; LL.M. 1978, SJD 1981, University of Virginia.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Id
2. Id
3. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1982).
4. 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), rev'g sub nom. United States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 79 F.
Supp. 12 (E.D. Mo. 1948), cert. denied 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
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courts should be cautious in citing Pevely as precedent. 5
II. PEVELY DAIRY Co. V. UNITED STATES AND ECONOMIC THEORY AS
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A. The Case
In 1948 the Pevely Dairy Company and the St. Louis Dairy Company
were convicted in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for
violating section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 6 by conspiring to fix the
wholesale and retail prices of grade A regular milk in the St. Louis area.
7
Following the convictions, separate motions by the defendants for an acquit-
tal notwithstanding the verdict, and alternatively, for a new trial and an
arrest ofjudgment were all denied.8 The defendants' separate appeals were
addressed in one opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit which held in Pevey Dairy Co. v. Untied States9 that, although
the indictment had sufficiently alleged that the defendants had conspired to
restrain interstate commerce, th evidence was insufficient to sustain their
conviction.' 0 The court of appeals reversed the lower court's judgment and
remanded for a new trial." The U.S. Supreme Court denied the govern-
ment's writ of certiorari.
12
The court of appeals decision reversing the convictions was based sub-
stantially' 3 upon expert witness testimony about economic theory, particu-
larly price uniformity in a market with standardized products, and its
relation to the Sherman Antitrust Act. 4 The record with respect to expert
economic testimony in Peveoy is incomplete. It appears, however, that the
court of appeals did not limit itself to considering only the economic testi-
mony by witnesses, but introduced, sua sponle, writings by economic theorists
as additional evidence.
15
5. These cases and the problems raised by their citation to Pevely are addressed in several
articles. See Note, Conscious Parallelism--Fact or Fancy?, 3 STAN. L. REV. 679, 693-98 (1951) [here-
inafter cited as Conscious Parallelism]. See also Turner, The Definition Of Agreement Under The
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism And Refisals To Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Turner]; Note, Antitrust Liabiliy For An Exchange 0fPrice Information-- What Happened To
Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L. REV. 639 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Liability].
6. See supra note I and accompanying text.
7. United States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 79 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Mo. 1948), rev'd sub nom.
Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
Before the convictions, the court had denied the defendant's preliminary motion to dismiss the
indictment. United States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 77 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
8. 79 F. Supp. at 12, 20.
9. 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949).
10. Id. at 366, 371.
11. Id at 371.
12. 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
13. See 178 F.2d at 368-69.
14. Id. For a general analysis of the need for an interdisciplinary approach to judicial
decision-making, see Kindt, An Analysis OfLegal Education And Business Education Within The Con-
text 0fA JD./MBA Program, 31 J. LEG. ED. 512, 518-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Legal
Education ].
15. See 178 F.2d at 378. See also Legal Education, supra note 14, at 518-19.
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B. Expert Testimony and Documentary Evidence Relied on in Pevely
In Pevely, the court noted that the two defendant dairies sold and dis-
tributed approximately 63 percent of the fluid milk consumed within the St.
Louis geographic area. 16 Specifically, the indictment alleged that the de-
fendants had conspired to fix wholesale and retail milk prices during the
previous ten years by an agreement under which only identical price changes
would be made. 1 7 The expert testimony and determinative evidence cited
by the court in Pevely, however, failed to draw any connection between the
particular market structure in which the defendants operated and the al-
leged conspiracy.
The court cites economic testimony from three expert witnesses to the
effect that in markets where there are standardized cost factors, such as St.
Louis, price uniformity is expected. '8 First, an expert witness identified only
as the Director of Dairy Marketing for the Illinois Agricultural Association
testified that the homogeneity of the milk made it a standardized product for
sellers.' 9 Second, an unidentified Professor of Economics at St. Louis Uni-
versity testified that milk was an extremely standardized product in the St.
Louis market, and that in fact, the product was essentially fungible between
dealers. 20 Finally, another unidentified expert economist testified with refer-
ence to the St. Louis milk market that uniform prices and simultaneous price
changes should be expected.
2'
Despite the indefinite references in the opinion to this expert testimony,
and, consequently, the considerable difficulty in analyzing the decision, the
court of appeals accepted the testimony of expert witnesses and other expert
authority to the effect that: a) the milk as a product was highly standard-
ized; b) the milk product of one dealer was the same as the product of an-
other dealer; c) with slight exceptions, uniformity of price was to be
expected; and d) practically simultaneous price changes were also to be ex-
pected. 2 2 These first two assertions constitute statements of facts; determina-
tions which were true not only when the appellate case was decided in 1949,
but also today. The second two statements were theoretical, however, and
did not represent either the prevailing viewpoint of economists in 1949, or
the current economic thought in this area. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals should have documented this expert economic testimony with author-
ity, instead of assuming its accuracy. The absence of citation to supporting
authority or relevant documentation imposes extreme difficulty upon com-
mentators examining Pevely and the court's ratio decidendi.
The court does eventually give a citation to expert authority. A then
current treatise23 by E. Chamberlin, a Harvard Professor of Economics, is set
16. 178 F.2d at 364.
17. Id.





23. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1948) [hereinafter
cited as Chamberlin 1948). All of the editions of "The Theory of Monopolistic Competition"
1984]
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forth to support the position that uniform prices do not have to imply price
or other market collusion.24 The court's reliance upon Mr. Chamberlin's
antitrust economic analysis is, however, misleading. First, the court seizes
upon an excerpt from Chamberlin, but then ignores its context. Second, the
court's use of Chamberlin's quote constitutes an oversimplification of his
analysis.
The Chamberlin quote utilized by the Court of Appeals stated specifi-
cally that in a duopoly, which was essentially the case in Pevely, there must
be "complete independence of the two sellers."'25 The Eighth Circuit clearly
misconstrues the context of Chamberlin's analysis. The analysis is predi-
cated upon complete independence of market participants; that is, there
could be no express or actual agreement. The court, however, does not focus
on the distinction Chamberlin's analysis draws between policy independence
and independence from actual agreements. To be sure, when a small
number of participants sells a substantial percentage of a product in a mar-
ket, their fortunes are not independent to the extent that each competitor
must take into account what the other companies are doing. Indeed, this
distinction is fundamental to the definitions of both a monopoly and duop-
oly. By economic definition, an agreement between two or more companies
in a duopolistic situation changes that situation into a monopolistic one.
26
Thus, although Chamberlin's work, which the court relies upon explic-
itly, emphasizes at least twice 2 7 that independence of market participants
does not mean policy independence, but rather an absence of express or tacit
agreement, 28 the court fails to consider this adequately. This failure be-
between 1938 and 1950 read basically the same in the chapter dealing with "duopoly and oli-
gopoly." The quotes utilized by the Court of Appeals in Pevely are identical in all of the respec-
tive editions-even as recently as 1965.
24. 178 F.2d at 368.
25. Id; see E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 31 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Chamberlin 1965]:
One of the conditions of the problem must be the complete independence of the two
sellers, for obviously, if they combine, there is monopoly. This independence must,
however, be interpreted with care, for, in the nature of the case, when there are only
two or a few sellers, their fortunes are not independent. There can be no actual, or
tacit, agreement--that is all. Each is forced by the situation itself to take into account
the policy of his rival in determining his own, and this cannot be construed as "tacit
agreement" between the two.
26. 178 F.2d at 368 (citing Chamberlin 1948, supra note 23, at 31.)
27. See Chamberlin 1948, supra note 23, at 31; Chamberlin 1965, supra note 25, at 31, 46-47.
28. In his book, Chamberlin distinguishes policy independence from independence involv-
ing actual collusion or agreements. In many oligopolistic situations, companies will be aware of
the policies of competing companies without the presence of any actual or tacit agreement.
Chamberlin states that:
[T]he assumption of independence cannot be construed as requiring the sellers to com-
pete as though their fortunes were independent, for this is to belie the very problem of
duopoly itself. It can refer only to independence of action-the absence of agreement
or of "tacit" agreement. For one competitor to take into account the alterations of
policy which he forces upon the other is simply for him to consider the indirect conse-
quences of his own acts.
Chamberlin 1948, supra note 23, at 46-47. See also Turner, supra note 5, at 672-73:
Even in markets with few sellers, a fairly sudden change in pricing patterns is ground
for suspicion. Agreement is indicated if prices have suddenly become much more sta-
ble, over the same range of conditions, than in past years or months. . . And in
general, any facts which would indicate uncertainty as to how competitors would de-
termine their price quotations make the appearance of identical prices strong evidence
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comes extremely important in connection with the fact that in Pevel'y the
evidence shows there was tacit-and probably express-agreement between
representatives of the Pevely Dairy Company and the St. Louis Dairy Com-
pany. 29 The sales manager for St. Louis Dairy, Mr. Gee, and the sales pro-
motion agent for Pevely Dairy, Mr. Wasser, met regularly over a ten year
period and considered several proposed price changes. 30 In fact, the Eighth
Circuit notes that the management of both defendant dairies "thoroughly
and analytically" 3 1 considered proposed price changes. This pattern of co-
operation and agreement constitutes more than competitors accounting for
each others' actions, and is clearly inconsistent with the idea of complete
independence of express or tacit agreement set forth in Chamberlin's anti-
trust economic analysis.
Chamberlin's economic analysis of duopoly and oligopoly behavior was
also oversimplified by the court. Chamberlin asserted that both duopoly
and oligopoly represented an amalgam of problems and not just a single
issue; 32 moreover, that based upon material assumptions and varying condi-
tions, different solutions were required.33 Because not one of the duopolistic
examples he presented in his work fit precisely into the factual situation in
Pereh,34 the Eighth Circuit should have turned its attention to the inherent
uncertainties in duopoly economic theory set forth by Chamberlin. 35 Had
the court focused upon these uncertainties in Pevely, such as the individual
behavior of the market participants, Chamberlin's analysis would be more
applicable, and would demonstrate that a duopoly-and perhaps a defacto
monopoly-was operating in Pevely.
The only other expert evidence cited 36 by the court is an article entitled
"Collusion," 37 which appeared in the December 1948 issue of Farm Econom-
ics, published by the Department of Agricultural Economics of the New
York State College of Agriculture. The Court cited to "Collusion" to show
of intercommunication, if not actual agreement, and thus of plainly unlawful conspir-
acy. The immunization of pure oligopoly pricing from the Sherman Act which I have
argued for here does not extend to agreements or understandings designed to convert
an imperfect oligopoly pricing pattern into a perfect one by eliminating uncertainties.
29. See 178 F.2d at 367. The Court notes that there is:
[U]ndisputed evidence that the matter of price changes was thoroughly and analyti-
cally considered by the management of appellants, consisting of certain of their of-
ficers, at regular meetings, at which the economic factors bearing upon costs were
ascertained, scrutinized and discussed, and that the [price] changes made occurred
only after a complete evaluation of the economic conditions and factors going into the
cost of production.
Id. See also 79 F. Supp. at 13-14.
30. 178 F.2d at 367.
31. Id.
32. See Chamberlin 1965, supra note 25, at 53.
33. Id
34. Id at 30-55.
35. Chamberlin states that:
Uncertainty, where present, as to (a) whether other competitors will hold their
amount or their prices constant, (b) whether they are far-sighted, (c) the extent of the
possible incursions upon their markets, (d) in the case of a time lag, its length, renders
the outcome indeterminate ....
Id at 54.
36. 178 F.2d at 368-69.
37. Collusion, FARM ECONOMICS, Dec. 1948 at 42-43 [hereinafter cited as Collusion].
1984]
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that uniform price changes in milk were to be expected. The article indi-
cates that wheat and cotton markets experience simultaneous changes in all
cities as prices fluctuate as competition forces all market participants to buy
at the same price. 38 This behavior reflects what economists expect in a per-
fectly competitive market. As this article will demonstrate, however, the two
defendants in Pevely operated in a tight oligopoly. Even in the 1940's, econo-
mists recognized that there was a distinct difference between farm produce
markets and exchanges where uniform prices were set by market forces,
39
and oligopoly markets where the participants established prices and dictated
price changes. Economists would not expect identical behavior in both situ-
ations. There is also considerable doubt whether the "Collusion" article is
authoritative. The article is a two page editorial whose only footnote admits
to the editorial's fictitious assumptions. 4°
The court also relies heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Cement Manufacturer's Protective Association v. United Slates4 1 as authority that
price uniformity was to be expected between the defendant dairies in
Pevely.42 Perhaps the Eighth Circuit felt constrained by Cement; however,
without challenging the Supreme Court's reasoning, the court of appeals
could have distinguished Cement by focusing on the factual differences pres-
ent in Pevely.
First, the response time between a price change by one company and
the subsequent similar price change by a competing company is greater in
Cement than in Pevel4 In Cement the corresponding price changes allowed
enough time for common knowledge of changed market conditions and
prices to operate, while in Pevely the price changes were either immediate or
38. Id.; 178 F.2d at 368-69.
There is nothing peculiar in the fact that a change in the price of wheat or cotton
occurs simultaneously in all markets. If the price of No. I Northern Spring Wheat in
Minneapolis rises 5 cents a bushel, it advances 5 cents in Baltimore, 5 cents in Buffalo,
5 cents in Chicago and 5 cents in all the small towns in Minnesota, North Dakota and
Montana. These prices not only all advance by the same amount, but they advance
on the same day. This is as it should be. There is no collusion. Under the free enter-
prise system, competition forces all handlers to pay the same price.
178 F.2d at 368-69.
39. See e.g,, P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 432, 488-89 (10th ed. 1976).
40. Collusion, supra note 37, at 42-43 n.1. "The percentages are, of course, fictitious, but the
principle is not." Id. In fact, the "Collusion" editorial is so full of inaccuracies and imprecise
terminology that any court should have questioned its authoritativeness.
41. 268 U.S. 588 (1925);see 178 F.2d at 369; see also Antitrust Liability, supra note 5, at 661
n.89.
42. See 178 F.2d at 369. Justice Stone set forth the Court's reasoning in Cement:
It appears to be undisputed that there were frequent changes in price, and uniformity
has resulted not from maintaining the price at fixed levels, but from the prompt meet-
ing of changes in prices by competing sellers.
It is urged by the defendants that such uniformity of price as existed in the trade
was due to competition .... A great volume of testimony was also given by distin-
guished economists in support of the thesis that, in the case of a standardized product
sold wholesale to fully informed professional buyers, as were the dealers in cement,
uniformity of price will inevitably result from active, free and unrestrained competi-
tion, and the government, in its brief, concedes that "undoubtedly the price of cement
would approach uniformity in a normal market in the absence of all combinations
between the manufacturers.
178 F.2d at 369 (quoting Cement, 268 U.S. at 605-06).
43. 268 U.S. at 605. In Cement the price changes were prompt.
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simultaneous. 44 Unreasonably short response times between competitors is
one factor suggesting an anticompetitive conspiracy exists. Second, the
Supreme Court concluded in Cement that no agreement existed between the
manufacturers and no information regarding sales contracts had been ex-
changed. 45 In Pevefr, however, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that repre-
sentatives of the defendant dairies had repeatedly discussed price policy and
proposed changes. 46 Third, in Cement, a standardized product was whole-
saled to dealers,4 7 whereas in Pevely, the milk product was sold directly to
consumers.48 In combination, these factual differences constitute enough to
distinguish the market situation and factual circumstances in Cement from
those in Pevely. Therefore, the court's citation to Cement as supporting au-
thority for economic theory is less than helpful.
III. THE CATEGORIZATION OF ST. Louis DAIRY MARKET AS A TIGHT
OLIGOPOLY
Following the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Cement, the court
of appeals in Pevelv held that given a standardized product such as milk,
uniform prices and price changes do not by themselves constitute a violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 49 Without more, this statement is supported
by current economic thought. 50 It must be kept in mind, however, that in
Cement the defendants successfully argued that the uniformity in price re-
flected competition in the market, free from collusion or agreement. 5i The
Pevely case involved tacit, if not actual, agreement 52 which was made more
probable by the tight oligopolistic or duopolistic situation in which the
Pevely Dairy and the St. Louis Dairy operated.
53
44. 79 F. Supp. at 13. In Pevely the price changes occurred on the "next day" or the "same
day." Id
45. 268 U.S. at 593.
46. See 178 F.2d at 367.
47. See 268 U.S. at 605; see also 178 F.2d at 369. In Cement "a standardized product [was)
sold wholesale tofidjl iformedprofessional buyers." 268 U.S. at 605. (emphasis added).
48. See 178 F.2d at 364.
49. Id at 369.
50. Turner, supra note 5, at 659. Specifically:
A large number of producers of a standardized commodity selling under stable market
conditions might be expected to charge the same price, a price set not by agreement
but by market conditions. None could charge more and make any sales, and there
would be no point in charging less because, under competitive assumptions, each
could sell at the established market price all that his costs made it profitable to sell.
But identical prices become suspicious if, for example, price has remained stable de-
spite a substantial decline in demand, if price has risen in the face of excess supply, or
if a large number of hungry producers with excess capacity have submitted identical
sealed bids in response to a large buyer's solicitation.
Id (emphasis added).
51. See 268 U.S. at 605-06.
52. See 178 F.2d at 367; 79 F. Supp. at 13-14.
53. Turner, supra note 5, at 664 (quoting Kaysen, Collustin Under The Sherman Act, 65 Q.J.
EcON. 263, 268 (1951)):
There are indeed many cases of completely or almost completely standardized prod-
ucts; but sellers will always have some differences in cost structures, face somewhat
different demand conditions, and be in ignorance of some relevant market facts.
Moreover, conditions are not static, they change; and change breeds uncertainty. In
short, in real life the "best" price for each seller in even the oligopolistic market will
never be the same; and even if it were, individual calculations by each seller based on
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B. The Categorizaion of the Pevely Dairy and the St. Louts Da'y as a "Tight
Ol'gopol'y"
By definition, an oligopoly exists in a particular industry when a signifi-
cant portion of the entire product output is controlled by only a few or sev-
eral firms. 54  Economists typically classify oligopolies as either loose or
tight.55 A tight oligopoly exists when the market concentration held by the
four largest producing companies is 50 percent or greater. 56 By contrast, in
a loose oligopoly the market concentration held by the four largest produc-
ing companies is between 15 and 40 percent. 5 7 A loose oligopoly tends to
imperfect and usually different information would normally lead, in the absence of
fully recognized interdependence, to different decisions as to price. For a pattern of
noncompetitive pricing to emerge in such a situation requires something which we
could, not unreasonably, call a "meeting of minds," or to use Professor Kaysen's
phrase, an "agreement to agree."
in addition, Turner points out that:
Even if some explicit communication at some time was not involved, though in reality
it probably always has been, explicit communication seems hardly a logically neces-
sary ingredient of the kind of agreement that is an element in the legal concept of
conspiracy. Considered purely as a problem in linguistic definition, there is no reason
to exclude oligopolistic behavior from the scope of the term agreement simply because
the circumstances make it possible to communicate without speech. It is not novel
conspiracy doctrine to say that agreement can be signified by action as well as by
words. And of course if there is agreement in the legal sense, the agreement seems
inescapably an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade because a price-fixing agree-
ment is unlawful per se.
Turner, supra note 5, at 665 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
223-24 (1940)).
54. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 116 (1977). But what number
of firms or companies, controlling what percentage of a market, is sufficiently concentrated to
constitute an oligopoly is not a matter susceptible for precise calculation. Id See generally C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY ch. 2 (1959) (developing a system of oligopolistic
classification: Type I oligopoly exists in markets in which the largest eight firms make greater
than fifty-percent of the total output and the largest twenty firms make more than seventy-five-
percent of the total output; Type II oligopoly exists in markets in which the largest eight firms
make one-third the total output and the largest twenty firms make seventy five-percent of the
total output) [hereinafter cited as Kaysen & Turner].
55. W. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 62-64 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Shepherd].
56. Id at 63. Specifically:
mhe high concentration enables the leading firms to coordinate well, much as if they
were really just parts of one dominant firm. Such "shared-monopoly" behavior may
not reach the scope and power of full monopoly or of a dominant firm, and it may
break down occasionally. Yet it does involve such intense fewness and interdepen-
dence that a "joint maximizing" of profits can crystallize and last. The rewards of
coordination are great, compared with the penalties of fighting; and the high concen-
tration makes it possible. Tight oligopoly may include, at the upper border, a domi-
nant firm. And it shades down into loose oligopoly. But the key feature still is: joint
behavior by a few leaders, able to make their cooperation stick.
Id at 63-64. A tight oligopoly is also referred to as a highly-concentrated oligopoly. See F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 155 (2d ed., 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Scherer; E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 109 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Singer]; Esposito & Esposito, Excess Capacity And Market Siructure, 56 REV. ECON. & STATIS-
TICS 188, 190, 190 n.12, 193 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Esposito].
57. Shepherd, supra note 55, at 64. See Scherer, supra note 56, at 60 (When a manufactur-
ing industry has a four-firm concentration of 40 percent or more there is an implication of
oligopoly); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 54, at 27-35 (1959) (In 1954, 59 percent of U.S. sales by
manufacturers were by oligopolistic manufacturers); Esposito, supra note 56, at 190 n.12 (A four-
firm concentration ratio of 70 or more indicates a tight oligopoly, while a ratio between 40 and
69 indicates a "partial" (loose) oligopoly, and a ratio below 40 indicates an atomistic industry).
See generally R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 54-55 (1976).
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lead to independent, effectively competitive behavior 58 where price coordi-
nation becomes sporadic and weak. Once stabilized, prices tend to remain
at competitive levels and excess profits are small.
59
The situation in Peve' clearly constituted a tight oligopoly or duopoly.
The two defendant dairies distributed approximately 63 percent of the milk
sold in the St. Louis area.6° As commentators have noted, this type of mar-
ket structure enables the largest companies to coordinate policies extensively
and effectively-competition is virtually absent. 6 1 Although a tight oligop-
oly market structure would theoretically lead to parallel pricing, approach-
ing price uniformity, it would not result in the identical pricing which
occurred in Pevely absent collusion.
B. Empirical Studies of Price Behavior in Oligopoly Markets with Standardized
Products
The evidence in Pevely provided by expert economic testimony and the
court's interpretation of an article and a treatise permitted the Eighth Cir-
cuit to conclude that given a standardized product, simultaneous price
changes were to be expected in an oligopoly market. At least two economic
studies reported during the 1970's indicate that pricing behavior in situa-
tions similar to that in Pevely is inconsistent with the court's reasoning.
1. The 1974 Study of Homogeneous Electricity Markets in
Oligopolistic Situations
In 1974, the pricing behavior of electric utilities was examined in mar-
kets where two utility firms existed in a single city,62 and consumers could
choose to be served by either Firm. This study provides a useful comparison
with Pevely. The market structure constitutes tight oligopolies or duopolies
and electricity, as a product, is standardized similar to the milk handled by
the two defendant dairies in Pevely.
Table A demonstrates that out of a sample of 23 duopoly firms there
were 84 price changes which were not followed within 3 years by a competi-
tor's price change. This behavior is quite inconsistent with the reasoning in
Pevey, in which the court concluded that simultaneous price changes were a
natural result. In fact, the economic conclusions accepted by the court in
Pevely supported the concept of a kinky demand curve for oligopolies, a the-
ory discredited as early as 1947.63 The study corrected for any time-lags due
58. See Shepherd, supra note 55, at 64.
59. See id
60. 178 F.2d at 364; 79 F. Supp. at 14.
61. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See also Scherer, supra note 56, at 155-60, 513-
14; Singer, supra note 56, at 74-103. See generay K. CLARKSON & R. MILLER, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 137-51, 156-65 (1982).
62. Primeaux & Bomball, A Reexamination of the Kia, Oligopoly Demand Curve, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 851 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bomball].
63. See generally id. at 855-60 (results from study comparing pricing behavior of monopoly
electric firms and duopoly electric firms failed to support the kinky demand curve theory); Si-
mon, A Further Test of the Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 971 (1969); Stigler,
The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices, 53 J. POL. ECON. 439 (1947), reprinted in G.




STATISTICAL DATA REPRESENTATIVE PRICE INCREASES AND
DECREASES FOR A STANDARDIZED PRODUCT IN A
DUOPOLY:
THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
1. Price increases not followed (within 3 years) 42
2. Price decreases notfollowed (within 3 years) 42




4. Delay in following price increases 18
1 year 18
5. Delay in following price decreases 15
1 year 10
2 years 5
6. Delay in changing in the opposite direction 11
Municipal initiated a decrease 1-year delay
in increasing 2
Private initiated a decrease 1-year delay
in increasing 4
Private initiated a decrease 3-year delay
in increasing 5
Price data is from the 1959-1970 time period. 1963 was excluded because the rate
categories were different for that one year, so comparisons could not be made.
Source: Bomball, infta note 62, at 858.
to regulation of prices in the electric industry.64 The table also shows that
during the same period there were 48 simultaneous price changes, but ten of
these were in the opposite direction, indicating that when one firm raised
prices, the other lowered prices. Additionally, although the 33 price changes
indicated on lines 4 and 5 of Table A tend to support the court's position in
Pevely, the 11 other changes on line 6 occur in the opposite direction and are
in conflict with that position.
2. The 1976 Study of the Prescription Drug Industry in
Oligopolistic Situations
In a 1976 article the pricing behavior of the prescription drug industry
was studied. 65 In the study, a duopoly was selected where only two drugs
kinky demand curve theory was independently and almost simultaneously advanced in 1939 by
Paul M. Sweezy of the United States and R. L. Hall and C. J. Hitch of the United Kingdom.
Stigler, infra, at 208; Sweezy, Demand Under Conditions of Ohgopoy, 47 J. POL. ECON. 568 (1939);
Hall & Hitch, Price Theory and Business Behavior, OXFORD ECON. PAPERS, May 1939, at 12.
64. Bomball, supra note 62, at 853, 859.
65. Primeaux & Smith, Pricing Patterns And The Kinky Demand Curve, 19 J.L. & EcON. 189
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were competing in a market. Additionally, extreme care was taken to class-
ify the two drugs as substitutes for one another, thereby making the product
standardized. Thus, the competitive conditions resembled the fluid milk
market in Pevdy. Table B presents price data for the prescription drug du-
opolies. The data is annual, so a delayed response of less than a year is
considered to be simultaneous. The table shows that of the 28 price changes
in the prescription drug industry, 15 supported the theory of simultaneous
price change reached by the court in Peve4', however 13 did not. The price
behavior suggested by results from the two studies discussed above strongly
suggests that the simultaneous price behavior observed in the St. Louis milk
market was not due to the particular market structure or the standardized
nature of the product, but rather to collusion between the defendants.
TABLE B
STATISTICAL DATA REPRESENTING PRICE INCREASES AND
DECREASES FOR STANDARDIZED PRODUCTS IN A
DUOPOLY:
THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG INDUSTRY
Pricing Behavior supporting the theory of uniform price change
Simultaneous price changes - decreases 2
Lagged response to price decrease - delay 1 year,
decreased prices 3
Simultaneous price changes - increases 4
Lagged response to price increases - delay I year,
increased prices 6
Total Number of price changes 15
Pricing Behavior inconsistent with the theory of uniform price
change
Price increases not followed in one year 5
Price decreases not followed in one year 3
Simultaneous price changes in opposite direction 2
Lagged response to price increases - delay 1 year,
decreased prices
Lagged response to price increases - delay 1 year,
one increase, one decrease 1
Lagged response to price decrease - delay 1 year,
increased prices
Total Number of price changes 13
Source: Smith, infra note 65, at 193-94.
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Smith]. This study of the pharmaceutical industry was undertaken
because a 1958 essay implied, without data, that the kinky demand curve theory applied to this
industry, and the 1958 essay was later read into the record of a Congressional Hearing on the
industry. See McEvilla, Pricing Determination Theory in the Pharmaceutical ndust.y, 82 DRUG & COS-
METIC INDUSTRY 34 (1958); Administered Prices in the Drug Industiy: Hearings on S 238 Before the




IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UTILIZATION OF PEVELY AS PRECEDENT
A. Conspiracy Inferred from Uniform Actions." "Conscious Parallelism" and
Pevely
In 1939, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States,66 set forth the doctrine of conscious parallelism, under which a Sher-
man Act conspiracy could be inferred from uniform action between competi-
tors.6 7 The Court held that if market competitors tacitly agree to participate
in a course of conduct which restrains interstate commerce, it constitutes a
prohibited conspiracy under the Sherman Act.68 In 1954, the U.S. Supreme
Court clarified its Interstate Circuit decision when it held, in Theatre Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrbuting Corp. ,69 that conscious parallelism consti-
tuted circumstantial evidence which could assist the finder of fact in infer-
ring an agreement; 70 however, conscious parallelism, by itself, would not
constitute evidence sufficient to find a conspiracy. 71 There have been several
analyses of conscious parallelism since Interstate Circuit which cite Chamber-
lin as authority.
72
Although neither party in Pevely invoked the doctrine of conscious par-
allelism, the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit has become erroneously en-
twined with the doctrine. For example, with respect to nonstandardized
products, price uniformity creates a presumption that the Sherman Act has
been violated, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in C-O-Two
Equipment Co. v. United States. 73 As precedent, however, Revel supports the
opposite presumption with respect to standardized products: that is, that
there is no Sherman Act violation. This difference is reflected in the anti-
66. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
67. For analyses of conscious parallelism and related issues, see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3
ANTITRUST LAW 359-63 (1978); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 217-23 (1967); R. POSNER &
F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 306-07,
330 n. 1 [hereinafter cited as POSNER]; Scherer, supra note 56, at 513-25. See generally Monroe &
Hill, The Predatory Picing Controvery: Academic Theories Enter The Courtroom, 13 U. TOLEDO L.
REV. 539 (1982) (discussion of proving element of predatory intent to monopolize or to destroy
competition within some relevant market); Note, Antitrust Law-Restraint Of Trade--Antirust Im-
plications of the Exchange of Pr.ce Infomation Among Competitors. The Container Corporation Case, 68
MICH. L. REV. 720 (1970) (discusses historically how the court has treated the practice of ex-
changing statistical pricing data among competitors) [hereinafter cited as Prtice Information]. Con-
spiracy Infernedfrom Uniform Action. Conscious Parallelism, ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 1.10 (C. Hills ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST ADVISOR 1978].
68. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 227.
69. 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (citing cases).
70. Id. at 540.
71. Id at 541; see Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71, 84-85 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing cases); see also ANTITRUST ADVISOR 1978, supra note 67,
§ 1.10 at 9.
Theatre Enterprises has become noted for the fact that the Supreme Court held "not that
conscious parallelism was an insufficient basis for finding of an unlawful contract, combination,
or conspiracy, but only that the plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict-i.e., that con-
scious parallelism was not sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of unlawful conspir-
acy." Posner, supra note 67, at 330 n. I (emphasis in original).
72. See, e.g., Price Information, supra note 67 at 727; Note, Conscious Parallelism, supra
note 4A at 679-80; but see Note, Antitrust Liability, supra note 5 at 642-45.
73. 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
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trust literature. For example, in the 1971 edition of the Antitrust Advisor, 74
Pevely is cited for the principle that with regard to a standardized product,
uniform prices do not tend to prove a Sherman Act conspiracy. 75 Moreover,
the 1978 edition of the Antitrust Advisor reinforces Pevely as precedent by in-
cluding the case in a checklist for evaluating conscious parallelism.
76
This distinction in antitrust literature is caused by the misinterpretation
of economic theory with respect to a tight oligopoly or duopoly which was
precipitated by the holding in Pevely. Although the Eighth Circuit in Pevely
perhaps did not recognize, and certainly failed to discuss, the significance of
the oligopoly market structure present, the prevailing economic theory, sup-
ported by substantial empirical evidence, suggests that Pevey was decided
incorrectly and should not be used as precedent.
The presumption inherent in the distinction is that a uniform price
tends to infer collusion regarding competitors who sell nonstandardized
products, but not those who sell standardized products. This presumption is
incorrect to the extent it fails to distinguish between tight and loose oligo-
polistic situations. In a tight oligopoly, such as Pevely, a uniform selling price
for a standardized product should raise a presumption of collusion in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. That is, if there is no evidence of an express agree-
ment, and the plaintiff provides sufficient evidence of the following: (1) a
tight oligopoly or duopoly; (2) a standardized product; and (3) uniform
prices, it should be presumed that there is an implied agreement or an agree-
ment to agree. The burden of proof should shift to the defendant to demon-
strate that there was no agreement or collusion in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
Although Pevely has received mild criticism, 77 legal commentators con-
tinue to cite it as authority, though usually only by way of qualified support
or accompanied by a caveat. 78 Currently, Peveo's use as precedent continues
74. ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 2.10 (C. Hills ed. 1971); See Note, Conscious Parallelism, supra
note 5, at 697-98.
75. ANTITRUST ADVISOR § 2.10 (C. Hills ed. 1971).
76. ANTITRUST ADVISOR 1978, supra note 67, at § 1.10. Specifically, the ADVISOR states:
The following criteria should be examined in determining whether uniformity of
action is sufficient to permit an inference of conspiratorial action:
1. How pervasive is the uniformity?
2. Is the product involved standardized or differentiated? Compare, e.g., C-O-Two
Fire Equipment Co. v. US (9th Cir. 1952) 197 F.2d 489, cert. den. (1952) 344 U.S.
892. 73 S.Ct. 211, 97 L.E. 690 with Pevdy Dairy Co. v. US. 8th Cir. 1949) 178 F.2d
366, cert. den. (1950) 339 U.S. 942, 70 S.Ct. 794, 94 L.E. 1358.
3. How nearly identical is the uniformity?
4. Is the market oligopolistic, containing few sellers? See e.g., Wall Products Co. v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co. (Cal. 1971) 326 F. Supp. 295.
5. Does it extend to price alone or to all other terms and conditions of sale?
6. In the case of price uniformity, have the defendants raised as well as lowered
prices in parallel fashion?
7. Can the conduct, no matter how uniform, be adequately explained by independ-
ent business justifications? See e.g., North Carolina v. Chas Pflier & Co. Inc. (4th Cir.
1975) CCH 1975-2 Trade Cases 60.663.
Id
77. See Note, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 5, at 693-98; see also Note, Antitrust Liability,
supra note 5, at 651.
78. See Note, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 5, at 693-98.
Since the mere "fact" of uniformity, without more, cannot rationally give rise to any
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to discourage a reexamination of price behavior in extreme oligopolistic situ-
ations, thereby indirectly thwarting thorough enforcement of the antitrust
laws.
B. The Major Cases Following Pevely
The major federal cases utilizing Pevely as precedent refer to two princi-
ples: first, that uniform prices for a standardized product do not raise a
presumption of a Sherman Act violation;79 and, second, that where circum-
stantial evidence is employed to prove collusion, all circumstantial evidence
must be consistent with the allegation.8 0 As an aside, this requirement for
circumstantial evidence appears reasonable when there is only circumstan-
tial evidence and not direct evidence available and when the case involves a
criminal prosecution rather than a civil cause of action.81 Despite the lower
standard of proof for civil as opposed to criminal cases, the presumption
should be the same: that in a tight oligopolistic or duopolistic fact situation
involving uniform prices and a standardized product, there is an implied
agreement to conspire and that the defendant must affirmatively prove
otherwise.
It should also be noted that the circumstantial evidence considered by
the Eighth Circuit in Pevely excluded any consideration of that market struc-
ture. As this article points out, however, the presence of a tight oligopoly or
duopoly significantly changes the economic assumptions regarding price be-
havior among competitors. Therefore, the use of Peve'y by courts to support
a particular interpretation of circumstantial evidence should be undertaken
with this infirmity in mind. Additionally, although this presumption of con-
spiracy appears theoretical and therefore would be considered circumstantial
evidence, there is a good argument for reclassifying it as direct evidence.
First, the existence of a standardized product is usually readily provable.
Second, that uniform pricing and simultaneous price changes exist are simi-
one inference in preference to another, it will not be probative by itself. But an exami-
nation of the setting in which the uniformity occurred, such as the duration and extent
of uniformity, the progressiveness of the industry, and other indicia of competition or
the lack of it, may well give rise to an inference of conspiracy or conscious parallelism.
If such factors are not presented to the trier of fact, then a verdict should be directed
on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. Even in the presence of added back-
ground, uniformity may give rise to conflicting inferences, upon which reasonable men
could differ. In such a case, where enough probative evidence is before the court, the
trier of fact should be free to draw the more reasonable inference. If proof of uniform-
ity without more is to be rejected, it should be done only on the ground that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of a certain behavior pattern.
All courts do not seem to agree with this analysis. In Pevely Dary Co. v. United
States the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ruled that proof
of uniform prices over a period of time did not constitute sufficient evidence to sustain
a criminal conviction of conspiracy under Section I of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 694.
79. See Pevely, 178 F.2d at 369.
80. See id. at 367. Specifically:
Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon to establish the conspiracy or any other
essential facts, it is not only necessary that all the circumstances concur to show the
existence of such conspiracy and facts sought to be proved, but such circumstantial
evidence must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.
Id
81. See Conscious Parallelism, supra note 5, at 696.
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larly provable. Third, as demonstrated earlier, the existence of a tight oli-
gopoly or duopoly can be defined numerically by the number of firms in a
market and their total percent of market share.8 2 Accordingly, the definite-
ness of proof inherent in this type of economic evidence lends itself to being
categorized as direct rather than circumstantial evidence.
The 1981 case of Weil v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Com-
pany83 followed both of the standards in Pevely mentioned above; specifically,
the erroneous doctrine that uniform prices involving a standardized product
in a tight oligopoly or duopoly do not create a presumption of a Sherman
Act violation, and the standard of proof required for economic circumstan-
tial evidence. The Welt case reemphasizes the connection between Pevely
and conscious parallelism. In Weit, it was argued that although parallel
pricing itself was insufficient evidence to prove price collusion, such pricing
combined with an opportunity to agree should be sufficient evidence to re-
quire a trial on the substantive issues.84 This standard should have been
applied by the court because the facts indicated the existence of a tight oli-
gopoly or duopoly. In any event, the court rejected the standard based on
the circumstantial evidence reasoning in Pevely, specifically that when a
party pursues a claim or cause of action based solely on circumstantial evi-
dence there must be a compelling suggestion of collusion.8 5 Weit involved a
standardized product similar to Pevel and, in fact, followed the erroneous
standardized product reasoning of Pevel; also.8 6 Fourteen years after Pevely,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had difficulty with another milk anti-
trust case, Beatrice Foods Company v. United States.8 7 Although the economic
scenario was substantially different from that in Pevely, the court had diffi-
culty distinguishing Pevely's standardized product reasoning in sustaining the
antitrust conspiracy conviction. 88 In Beatrice Foods, the court sustained the
conviction for conspiracy. Perhaps the court would not have encountered
such difficulty with Pevel if it had recognized and applied the correct eco-
nomic reasoning in 1949.
As precedent, Pevely constitutes a significant hurdle, but several courts
have distinguished Pevel in a variety of ways. In the 1966 case of Sanitay
82. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
83. 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1981).
84. See id at 463.
85. See id.
86. "Similarly, in civil anti-trust cases, courts have noted that parallel pricing or conduct
lacks probative significance when the product in question is standardized or fungible." 641
F.2d at 463 (citations omitted). See also Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 819 (1973) (trial court's finding of improper price influencing over-
turned for lack of evidence); Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322
F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963) (directed verdict for defendants on a concerted boycott claim affirmed).
87. 312 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 373 U.S. 904 (1963).
88. See Beatrice Foods, 312 F.2d at 43. In particular:
We recognize, too, that fluid milk is a highly standardized commodity which provides
little room, if any exists at all, for quality differences or for special or advantageous
purchases of the raw product from suppliers and which, because of uniform labor
contracts, encounters processing costs of rigid consistency. This court noted these very
factors in Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, . . . These stubborn facts of the milk business,
by their very existence, present difMculties in the prosecution of an antitrust case against commercial
dai- .
Id at 42-43 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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Milk Producers v. Berg/ans Farm Dai'l, Inc. 89 the Eighth Circuit impliedly criti-
cized Pevely by holding that an inference drawn by the jury and court from
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain finding that the defendant
conspired to fix prices. 90 The court's rationale in Sanitary Milk is similar to
that used by Chamberlin when referring to an oligopolistic scenario, and as
such, provides a useful comparison to that of Chamberlin.91 In 1965, the
Eighth Circuit had already decided in National Dairy Products v. United States
9 2
that the circumstantial evidence rule articulated in Pevely was not determi-
native when there was direct evidence.9 3 As suggested earlier, the numerical
evidence, currently considered circumstantial evidence, establishing the
existence of a tight oligopoly or duopoly should be recharacterized as direct
evidence. The rigor of the circumstantial evidence principle established in
Pevely was challenged as early as 1952 by C-O-Two, 94 which is now Pevely's
companion case.
Despite these express and implied criticisms of Pevely and its circumstan-
tial evidence principle, even by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals which
originally decided Pevely, the majority of cases have followed the erroneous
economic theories and the concomitant principles established by Pevely as
precedent. 95 Pevely needs to be reversed with regard to specific holdings.
V. CONCLUSION
While some courts have expressly and impliedly criticized Pevely Dairy
Co. v. United States, the case continues to be cited as precedent. Specifically,
Pevely set forth the principle that in the case of a standardized product, uni-
form pricing is a natural result of the competitive economic market and is
not indicative of an antitrust violation. However, this holding was the result
of erroneous expert testimony and misinterpretation and misapplication of
economic theory. The economic theory adopted by the court in Pevel did
not represent the predominate viewpoint of economists in 1949 and it does
not represent the viewpoint today, particularly in light of several empirical
studies of price behavior in a tight oligopoly or duopoly.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pevel did not consider the eco-
nomic behavioral significance of a tight oligopoly or duopoly. In a tight
oligopoly or duopoly, uniform pricing of a standardized product does not
usually occur in the absence of an express or implied agreement between
market participants to control prices. Therefore, uniform pricing in such a
89. 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
90. Id at 690.
91. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
92. 350 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965).
93. Id at 325.
94. We are not unmindful of the standard suggested in Pevely . . . . But that is not to
say, as appellants would have us do, that such a rule must be separately applied to
each link in the chain of circumstances and if one such unit does not fit the standard
then the whole is likewise vulnerable.
197 F.2d at 494.
95. See Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 145 (6th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Outer Harbor Dock & Wharf Co., 124 F. Supp. 337, 340 n.7 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Ronson
Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, 112 F. Supp. 676, 682 (E.D. Mo. 1953).
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situation strongly suggests a conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. At the minimum, such a situation creates the presump-
tion of a violation. This presumption should be applied in both criminal
and civil cases.
Additionally, Pevely established a rigorous standard for the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence in antitrust cases. In light of the actual evidence of-
fered in Pvell, however, that was characterized as circumstantial, this
rigorous standard needs to be reexamined. Moreover, because the existence
of a tight oligopoly or duopoly can be determined with numerical factual
evidence, such evidence should more properly be recharacterized as direct
evidence. Finally, we suggest that Peveoy's association with conscious paral-
lelism be terminated or at least specifically qualified by the courts when the
opportunity arises, in order to bring the judiciary's antitrust economic analy-
sis more in line with current economic thought.

